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A B S T R A C T
This empirical study investigates cognitive shifts in both leader and follower teams when developing consensus
or agreement in how to resolve a slowly emerging organizational crisis over time. The cognitive maps of leaders
and followers are analyzed in team settings to explain where consensus is formed. The findings indicate that
consensus, or the agreement on the causal beliefs held to be critical to organizational adaptation and success,
builds over time within both leader and follower teams. However, when comparing the development of con-
sensus longitudinally, the findings confirm that the mental models of leadership teams converge towards fol-
lower teams, and not the other way around, during the crisis. The study provides new insights into the im-
portance of the causal beliefs of follower teams when developing a vision to coordinate action to resolve a crisis.
Introduction
Organizational crises are high-impact events that threaten the via-
bility of organizations (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Consequently, for-
mulating and directing a vision to resolve a crisis is a significant chal-
lenge for leaders (Mumford, Friedrich, Caughron, & Byrne, 2007). One
initial task is to make sense of the ambiguous conditions thrown up by
the crisis, because different interpretations of the same events can occur
even within teams in individual firms (Combe & Carrington, 2015;
Kilduff, Angelmar, & Mehra, 2000; Markóczy, 1997). In this context,
leaders' mental models are held to be critical to leader performance,
because they provide the basis of sensemaking for vision formation to
take place (Mumford et al., 2007). So in the face of a crisis, a key task
for leaders is to develop a new consensual prescriptive mental model,
consisting of shared causal beliefs for understanding and responding to
the crisis (Mumford et al., 2007; Weick, 1995).
Prior research points to two major hurdles that need to be overcome
to successfully resolve a crisis. One, is that leaders need to develop new
mental models to fit with the new environmental conditions thrown up
by the crisis (Barr, 1998; Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Hodgkinson,
1997). This development requires cognitive shifts to overcome any
cognitive inertia. Two, consensus, or shared agreement with others in
management teams, is required to ensure full commitment to a vision
needed to resolve the crisis (Markóczy, 2001). We define consensus in
individuals' mental models when envisioning a response to a crisis, as
the agreement on causal beliefs held to be critical to organizational
adaptation and success (see Markóczy, 2001). If consensus is not
reached, and leaders disagree on the way forward, they cannot co-
ordinate remedial action with followers within their organization.
However, while prior research has highlighted that cognitive shifts
are required in leaders so that their mental models fit with any new
crisis conditions (Barr et al., 1992; Foldy, Goldman, & Ospina, 2008),
the links to followers' mental models has received very limited research
attention. Followers are important for strategy implementation
(Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Raes, Heijltjes, Glunk, & Roe, 2011;
Rouleau & Balogun, 2011). Consequently, unless we also study how
followers contribute to the resolutions of crises, we will have an in-
complete understanding of organizational adaptation. Surprisingly,
empirical research showing how both leaders and followers change
their mental models to form consensus around an envisioned future to
resolve a crisis is lacking. The purpose of the current paper is to address
this gap in knowledge.
We contribute to a further understanding of sensemaking and con-
sensus within vision formation required to resolve an organizational
crisis. There is an expectation, based on vision formation theory
(Mumford & Strange, 2002) that leaders make sense of the new situa-
tion first. They then develop a new consensual prescriptive mental
model on how to respond to a crisis. Leaders are then thought to
communicate this mental model to followers through a process of
sensegiving, so that followers also change. There is some limited
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empirical support to give weight to this expectation, because leaders'
communication has been found to be important to the development of
followers' mental models. In a laboratory setting, Marks, Zaccaro, and
Mathieu (2000) found that one-way communication from leaders in-
fluenced mental models in follower teams, thereby improving perfor-
mance in novel environments. Likewise, shared team mental models
have been found to converge, based on different leadership styles and
settings (Dionne, Sayama, Hao, & Bush, 2010). However, there are no
studies investigating the spread of consensus within the mental models
of both leaders and followers facing a crisis within a naturalistic setting.
Without additional knowledge of followers' mental models, we will
have a poor understanding of how a vision to resolve a crisis materi-
alizes to coordinate remedial action.
We begin with a discussion of the theoretical background relating to
dealing with organizational crises. After a discussion of vision forma-
tion theory, we outline the prior research into mental models in the
context of sensemaking and the development of new mental models
during crises. Subsequently, we discuss shared mental models in teams
before outlining the available evidence on the sources of influence on
mental models. Finally, we present our hypotheses, method and find-
ings.
Theoretical background and hypothesis development
Vision formation theory
Definitions of a vision can be summarized as a set of beliefs about
how people should act, as well as interact, to attain some idealized
future state (Mumford & Strange, 2002; Strange & Mumford, 2002).
Cognitive vision formation theory (Mumford and Strange, 2002) pro-
vides an explanation of how leaders develop a vision for the future
following reflection on key issues and problems through a process of
sensemaking (Weick, 1995). More recently, Mumford et al. (2007) have
developed this theory to provide a sequential model of vision formation
during crises. In this theoretical model, vision formation first involves
the activation of descriptive mental models, which describe the system
as it is. Then, cognitive shifts to a more consensual prescriptive mental
model are required, which conceptualizes a vision for the future
(Mumford et al., 2007). Developing a vision around a solution to the
problems thrown up by the crisis is critical to galvanize remedial action
quickly. In contrast to envisioning the future within non-crisis condi-
tions, leaders are under considerable stress and time pressure. After
developing a vision, leaders are usually required to reconfigure re-
sources to enable a successful adaptation to a crisis, but this may be
stressful for followers (Yukl, 2008). So obtaining agreement on the way
forward is a major challenge.
While vision formation theory suggests that leaders make sense of a
crisis, and then envision the future to give meaning to followers in a
sensegiving process, there is a lack of empirical support for this ex-
pectation within naturalistic settings. Therefore, additional knowledge
is required to understand how both leaders and followers form con-
sensus to resolve a crisis. This knowledge would throw more light on
the reasons for successful organizational adaptation.
Sensemaking and the development of new mental models during crises
When first encountering a crisis, one initial challenge for leaders is
to make sense of the ambiguous conditions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).
This is not a simple task as there is much complexity faced by leaders
when making sense of ambiguous conditions during a crisis. Weick
(1995) points out that sensemaking is associated with understanding
the cognitive filters that people use. Individuals simplify complexity
through their mental models, so as not to be overwhelmed by data (Daft
& Weick, 1984). Thus, sensemaking highlights a major issue that in-
fluences leader performance. Due to the effort of analytical decision
making (Evans, 2008) and limitations of human information processing
(Miller, 1956), humans tend to use automatic information processing
based on mental representations of the world. Mental models are re-
presentations in the mind (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird,
1983) based around the notion that thought predicts events and models
reality (Craik, 1943). They are useful mechanisms for describing a
system's purpose, explaining its functioning, and predicting future
states (Rouse & Morris, 1986).
Mental models are useful in many decision-making situations.
However, they are likely to be of historical environments, because they
are developed through case based or experiential knowledge (Mumford
et al., 2007) and learning (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). This is a problem
when confronting crises, because historically developed mental models
may not fit with the new conditions encountered. As mental models
used in sensemaking are developed through prior experience, they are
likely to be partially idiosyncratic and stable, so difficult to change
(Barr et al., 1992).
Prior research into the antecedents of mental models confirms that
they are difficult to develop and change. This is especially problematic
when facing organizational crises, because of the speed of change re-
quired due to time pressure. Empirical studies confirm that hetero-
geneous mental models exist within individual firms. Thus empirical
findings fit with the notion that different experiences, as well as the
alternative job roles based around different task environments, shape
mental models (Daniels, Johnson, & Chernatony, 1994; Hodgkinson &
Johnson, 1994). However, in contrast, other researchers have found
homogeneous mental models within specific industries (Porac, Thomas,
& Baden-Fuller, 1989). Likely explanations for similarities in mental
models are cited as core assumptions around organizational identity
and competition and the presence of environmental stability
(Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994).
Prior longitudinal empirical research into the ability to change
mental models is rather scant. An early empirical study concluded that
developing new beliefs about causality is not easy (Barr et al., 1992). A
small number of more comprehensive longitudinal studies followed,
involving larger samples, which found evidence of cognitive inertia
(Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger & Palmer, 1996). These studies concluded
that in turbulent environments, changes in mental models lag behind
external environmental changes. Similarly, in another study (Lindell,
Melin, Gahmberg, Hellqvist, & Melander, 1998), researchers found that
a framework of strong stable beliefs, values and assumptions were
present in individuals over long periods of time. When considering
these empirical findings, it is possible to conclude that developing new
mental models to deal with novel crisis conditions is neither quick nor
easy.
The development of consensus as shared mental models in teams1
After changing mental models to fit crisis conditions, the next stage
is to form consensus around a vision to resolve a crisis. A number of
scholars have highlighted the importance of shared mental models
within a team settings to facilitate coordinated action (see Burke, Stagl,
Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse,
1993; Day, Gronn, & Salas, 2004; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Marks
et al., 2000). Leading the response to a crisis within more complex
organizations is likely to require leaders to orchestrate effort due to the
presence of multi-teams at different hierarchical levels (DeChurch,
Hiller, Murase, Doty, & Salas, 2010). Empirical research on the effects
of leadership on the performance of multi-teams has highlighted the
1 As the focus of this current empirical research was on consensus in mental
models directed at decisions to resolve a crisis we focused on the content of
mental models as discussed in the decision-making literature. The literature on
the content of shared mental models delineates between team mental models
and task mental models (see Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010, for a
thorough review).
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importance of training leaders (DeChurch & Marks, 2006). However,
teams cannot be trained for every contingency when resolving organi-
zational crises. In crisis conditions, teams have limited experience of the
problems they have to face, because these are invariably novel (LePine,
2005). Individuals not only have to make sense of ambiguous events
and overcome any cognitive inertia, but also agree on the way forward.
Prior research confirms that when faced with complex problems,
collective sensemaking helps by pooling expertise (Eden & Ackermann,
2010; Seidl & Werle, 2018). Salas, Rosen, and DiazGranados (2010)
point to the importance of different levels of expertise in leaders due to
the effect of domain-specific knowledge on pattern recognition when
making sense of the environment. Different expertise is likely to gen-
erate a more extensive discussion of strategic options to implement
when responding to a crisis (see Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Miller,
Burke, & Glick, 1998). However, this requires diversity in thinking
which sets up a dilemma when attempting to resolve organizational
crises. While cognitive diversity helps alleviate errors of judgement,
when pooling expertise during sensemaking, this diversity may be a
main reason why forming consensus to resolve crises is difficult later
on.
Longitudinal empirical evidence of cognitive shifts in mental models
within team settings as they reach consensus are rare. Markóczy (2001)
provides one rare example of more detailed empirical evidence of
changes to mental models and the development of consensus over time.
The longitudinal study was focused on individual managers within
three firms as they grapple with external change. The findings point to
cognitive shifts and the development of consensus occurring in an in-
terest group, whose members benefited from the direction of a strategic
change. In another more recent longitudinal empirical study, Combe
and Carrington (2015) found cognitive shifts to consensus occurred
within specific leadership teams when responding to an organizational
crisis. In other words, consensus developed in teams, rather than the
leadership as a whole. However, followers were not the focus of the
study, so the development of consensus within both leaders and fol-
lowers as they respond to a crisis is poorly understood.
When considering prior research into the development of consensus
in team settings, scholars point to the importance of different opinions
during collective sensemaking. This cognitive diversity aids a thorough
analysis of crisis conditions and the development of strategic options.
Then, consensus must be reached within both leader and follower
teams, so that a unified response can occur. Therefore, we offer the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In response to a crisis, consensus in beliefs in how to
achieve success within their organization will form within both leader
and follower teams over time.
Consensus will be demonstrated by similarities in beliefs thought to
be important to achieve organizational success (including similarities in
objectives, means or strategies to achieve them and other causal beliefs)
within the same firm as leaders and followers address the same crisis.2
As crises do not neatly conform to existing mental models, cognitive
shifts are required for a response to a crisis to take place (Marcy &
Mumford, 2010). It is this individual cognitive shift from one mental
model to another (Foldy et al., 2008) which makes forming consensus
possible (Ospina & Foldy, 2010). Dionne et al. (2010) demonstrate how
individuals' mental models can converge to form consensus. Conse-
quently, a shift in cognition requires flexibility in thinking and it is this
that can trigger organizational adaptation particularly when facing
novel environments (Gupta, 1984; Walsh, 1995). However, there is
limited empirical research into the cognitive shifts experienced by
leaders and followers as they respond to a crisis. Based on vision for-
mation theory discussed above, we assume that leadership teams will
make sense of the crisis first. Therefore, leaders will change their
thinking most in the initial response to a crisis, because it is their role to
consider the strategic issues facing the organization. Therefore, we put
forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. In response to a crisis, initially, leadership teams will
have a higher degree of cognitive shift than follower teams.
The source of influence in mental models during crises
Shared team mental models facilitate coordinated action when
teams face novel circumstances. Experimental studies have confirmed
that shared team mental models are important for team effectiveness
and performance (see Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, &
Salas, 2005; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers,
2000). Shared task mental models also influence performance (Lim &
Klein, 2006). However, empirical research on the source of influence in
terms of leaders and followers is rather limited. As noted above, prior
empirical research into the source of influence on the content of mental
models has largely focused on social and cultural environmental effects
and the functional job roles of top managers (Daniels, Johnson, & de
Chernatony, 2002). More recently, in a study of team composition,
Fisher, Bell, Dierdorff, and Belohlav (2012) found that a personality
trait, agreeableness, was positively related to similarities in team
mental models.
Very limited attention in prior research has been devoted to in-
vestigating the influence of leader mental models on follower mental
models, or vice versa. The empirical study by Marks et al. (2000) is a
notable exception. The researchers found that teamwork training and
leaders' communication in briefings increased the level of shared team
mental models, which influenced the performance of teams. Leaders'
communication also influenced the flexibility of mental models, which
changed to adapt to novel environments. However, this evidence is
based on an experimental research design. Leaders had prior knowledge
of the task and were able to give advice to follower teams via uni-
directional one-way communication. Organizational crises in natur-
alistic settings present a different set of challenges. Leaders will not
necessarily have prior knowledge of responding to a crisis, so will have
difficulty passing on knowledge to followers. Both leaders and followers
will be attempting to make sense of the ambiguous conditions. Another
difference is that two-way communication is likely so followers can also
influence leaders.
Building on this previous research, it is noteworthy to conclude that
prior research into team mental models has started to investigate lea-
ders as a source of influence into shared mental models. However, re-
search into the similarities and differences between leader mental
models and follower mental models is lacking. Marks et al. (2000)
found a relationship between leader briefings and the content of fol-
lower mental models in team settings in the laboratory, but leaders'
mental models were not investigated for direct comparison. In this
current study we aim to address this limitation. We investigate simi-
larities and differences in the mental models of both leader and follower
teams, as they respond to a crisis over time in a naturalistic setting.
When considering prior research into the source of influence in
mental models, theory suggests that during a crisis the leaders of an
organization will develop and communicate the vision for the future to
followers. As a result, there is an expectation that consensus in how to
resolve the crisis will develop first in the leaders so they can envision
the future for followers. Therefore, we put forward the following hy-
pothesis:
Hypothesis 3a. In response to a crisis, leadership teams will be the
initial locus of consensus or shared beliefs in how to achieve success
within their organization.
2 We did not introduce the issue of crisis into our data collection as we
thought that labeling any issues would bias responses. Consequently, we in-
vestigated the content of mental models when directed at the standardized task
of achieving success of the organization.
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Much of the research into vision content and vision communication
assumes that leaders envision the future for followers. This might be a
valid assumption in non-crisis conditions, but even in these conditions,
followers are theorized to have an important role (see Stam, Lord,
Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2014). However, in crises conditions some prior
research suggests that the assumption that leaders agree on a way
forward first, and then convey this to followers is too simplistic. Re-
search that emphasizes the political nature of strategic decision making
within team settings has an alternative message. Researchers such as
Walsh and Fahey (1986), for example, have long pointed to the inter-
play between individuals' beliefs and self-interest in strategy formula-
tion processes. In other words, the self-interest of followers may en-
courage them to influence a vision for the future for their own ends.
Additionally, the more recent follower-centric leadership research has
begun to highlight the possibility of a complex picture of influence
(Carsten, Uhl-Bien, West, Patera, & McGregor, 2010; Kohles, Bligh, &
Carsten, 2012; Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005; Uhl-Bien, Riggio, Lowe, &
Carsten, 2014).
Empirical evidence suggests that sensemaking can be outside the
control of top managers, especially in decentralized organizations
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Managers in non-leadership roles can make
sense of change for others (Balogun, 2003). Additional empirical evi-
dence also confirms that sensegiving by non-leaders is present in orga-
nizations, and this can be triggered by issues where leaders are per-
ceived to be incompetent (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). Responding to a
crisis may be one of these issues, especially if problems were possibly
foreseen, and leaders were perceived to be dragging their feet.
Therefore, an alternative possible explanation for influence in vision
formation, based on some empirical evidence, is that followers can be
involved in sensemaking and sensegiving. The input of followers may
be encouraged when action to resolve a crisis is considered at an op-
erational level, closer to their experience. The leadership role may be
distributed to include followers (Friedrich et al., 2014) due to the
presence of teams (Burke, Fiore, & Salas, 2003). Consequently, a pro-
cess of co-development of a vision by leaders and followers may occur
when responding to a crisis (Valcea, Hamdani, Buckley, & Novicevic,
2011).
In short, the expected linear top-down sensegiving from leaders to
envisage the future for followers may or may not occur. Currently,
when responding to an organizational crisis we do not know if leaders
shape the shared mental models in follower teams or these teams shape
leaders' mental models or if co-development takes place. This is a
complex research agenda for studies in naturalistic settings, however,
due to the amount of communication and influence that can take place
during an organizational crisis. In this current study, our more modest
aim is to investigate the results of the expected influence, based on
vision formation theory. While this theory suggests that consensus will
spread from leadership teams to follower teams when resolving an or-
ganizational crisis, an alternative hypothesis is suggested as follows:
Hypothesis 3b. In response to a crisis, follower teams will be the initial
locus of consensus or shared beliefs in how to achieve success within
their organization.
In this current empirical study, we investigate the content of mental
models, or what individuals think about a particular domain, in team
settings. Following Markóczy (2001) we conceptualize the content of
mental models to include beliefs about a stimulus domain and the
causal relationships between these beliefs. Most prior research in-
vestigates consensus by studying ends (objectives and goals) and means
(strategies) used in strategic decision making (see Kellermanns, Walter,
Lechner, & Floyd, 2005). However, Markóczy (2001) advocates a more
holistic investigation, because leaders and followers have different job
roles. An investigation of only ends and means may bias the research to
focus on issues important to leaders only, due to their more strategic job
roles. Consequently, in this current study we adopt a holistic in-
vestigation and analyze shifts in the content of mental models in terms
of beliefs, including causal beliefs, held to be critical to organizational
adaptation and success (Markóczy, 2001).
Method
To investigate cognitive shifts in leaders and followers when re-
sponding to a crisis we used a research design that ensured the gen-
eration of rich data which included the complexity of similarities and
differences in mental models at an individual level (see Bougon, Weick,
& Binkhorst, 1977; Combe & Carrington, 2015; Hodgkinson & Johnson,
1994; Markóczy, 1997; Wacker, 1981; Walsh, 1988; Weick, 1979). A
single case study method was used (see Yin, 2013) as the most suitable
to allow the in-depth study of mental models during the crisis at all
levels within an organization.
The case study firm and context
The chosen case study firm is a not-for-profit organization, that for
the purposes of this research, is anonymized as ‘Health Change UK’. The
organization operates in the United Kingdom's health sector, which
over recent years has undergone dramatic changes. These changes were
due to major political reforms to the healthcare system, which trans-
formed the process of commissioning for public service contracts (the
sector's principle funding source). The government deregulated the
public service sector, which allowed for increased competition from the
private sector. This radical change, imposed by government, eventually
led to a financial crisis within the firm due to the loss of contracts worth
27.2% of turnover over a three-month period. As the loss of contracts
was an early direct result of government intervention outside their
control, the organization questioned the viability of the organization in
this new competitive landscape. While the government reforms were
sudden or abrupt, the crisis itself can be described as leaning more
towards the smoldering and cumulative type (Hwang & Lichtenthal,
2000; James & Wooten, 2005). The viability of the organization was
only questioned after the loss of several large contracts over a very
short period of time. The speed of the losses contributed significantly to
the shock and the realization that the organization was operating in a
completely new competitive landscape.
Sample
The initial participants consisted of 40 permanent members of staff.
This number represented approximately 20% of the full time workforce.
The sample included the entire leadership team (the whole of the board
of directors and regional middle managers) as well as followers lower
down in the organizational hierarchy. However, due to sample attrition
over the 18months from phase 1 to phase 2 of data collection, only 31
participants were included in phase 2 (for descriptive statistics fol-
lowing sample attrition see Table 1). In subsequent analysis, we focus
on these 31 longitudinal responses only.
Using a stratified sampling method, the participants were chosen
randomly based on their position in the organization (from all levels
and job classifications), the period spent at the company (well-estab-
lished and newer staff) and their service locations (the full range of six
staff locations). Respondents also completed a short questionnaire to
verify and provide additional information on age, gender, job role, lo-
cation of work, and time spent at the company. Table 2 provides further
information regarding the leaders and followers in the organization.
Cognitive mapping
To support the investigation of the mental models in leadership and
follower teams and to triangulate the data, an interview protocol with
different stages was developed to include a variety of data collection
techniques (Combe & Carrington, 2015). We used sorting technique,
common in psychological research (Rosenberg, 1982), as the starting
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point to the standardized procedure for eliciting cognitive maps out-
lined by Markóczy and Goldberg (1995). This standardized procedure
was used because it offers advantages when cognitive maps are com-
pared and contrasted. In alternative, idiosyncratic procedures, differ-
ences in cognitive content may not be due to differences in participants'
beliefs, but a direct result of the interview length if more issues are
discussed. The standardized elicitation procedure overcomes such er-
rors, because there is no direct communication between the interviewer
and respondent during the card sort procedure and the elicitation of the
cognitive maps (see Walsh, 1988).3 Another main advantage is that the
full content of mental models can be assessed, because beliefs and the
causal relationship between beliefs, are included in data collection for
analysis. In contrast, other alternative methods in the study of team
mental models are common. For example, repertory grid has been used
in several studies (see Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu
et al., 2005). This alternative method has some advantages in terms of
the extensive pairwise comparisons of the similarities and differences
between factors investigated, but does not capture causal connections
between beliefs for data collection or analysis (Brown, 1992). There-
fore, due to this inadequacy, and considering the importance of causal
beliefs in resolving crises, the repertory grid method was not used in
this current study.
All the face-to-face interviews were designed to identify each
manager's beliefs about important factors for success of the organiza-
tion. We did not want to label the difficulties experienced by the or-
ganization as ‘a crisis’ as we were concerned that this label might bias
the responses. Consequently, in both sets of interviews we continued to
use the standard procedure for elicitation of cognitive maps outlined by
Markóczy and Goldberg (1995) which standardizes the goal for each
interview as ‘factors important for success (of the organization)’. We
asked the participants to generate their own cognitive maps in real-time
during the interviews. We used this approach because it is possible to
verify the accuracy of the cognitive maps produced by the participants
during the remainder of the interviews, and alleviates the need for any
post hoc interpretation by the researcher (see Hodgkinson, Maule, &
Bown, 2004).
Both leaders and followers were twice subjected to face-to-face in-
terviews by the same researcher (the lead author); once in 2011 and
again 18months later in 2013. This time-frame was chosen due to the
cumulative nature of the crisis. The crisis itself was not predicted at the
Table 1
Sample descriptive statistics.
Original Useable Leaders Followers
No. of interviewees 40 31 12 19
TR - Trustees (Executive Committee) 3 2 2 –
TM - Top Management Team (Inc.
CEO)
4 4 4 –
MM – Middle Managers 7 6 6 –
HO - Head Office Staff 6 6 – 6
PR - Practitioners (Client Facing Staff) 20 13 – 13
Leaders 14 12 – –
Followers 26 19 – –
Female 25 19 5 14
Male 15 12 7 5
Average age (years old)a 43.10 42.45 50.17 37.58
Average time at company (months)a 78.40 73.61 119.33 44.74
a Captured at the start of data collection in Phase 1.
Table 2
Details of leaders and followers included in the study.
Leaders
Trustees These are a non-executive board of directors. The trustees also consist of a chair of the trustees as well as the treasurer (these were both included in
the sample). Collectively, the trustees appoint the CEO as well as governing and having legal responsibility for the organization. The executive
committee, which includes trustees and the top management team, meet quarterly to discuss strategic issues alongside other subcommittees.
Top Management Team The TMT consisted of four senior managers that were all included in the sample. They comprised of the Chief Executive Officer, Finance Manager
(CFO), and two Area Managers, one of which was the Practice Development Manager. The Finance Manager had oversight of the head office support
staff (Team 8) but no middle manager. One Area Manager oversaw two middle managers, which looked after two teams (Teams 1 and 2), whilst the
other oversaw four middle managers and their respective teams (Teams 3 to 6). The TMT would exclusively meet monthly in Senior Manager Team
meetings.
Middle Managers The middle management team consisted of seven regional service managers. However, one was unavailable for the research project. These service
managers had oversight of the various service locations across the UK. The services operated as satellites with middle managers permitted some
autonomy over budgets and strategic direction of services to respond to local needs. The six middle managers ran the respective services, which




Teams 1 to 7
The practitioner level of the organization was the client-facing staff or the equivalent to frontline employees. These employees made up the vast
majority of the staff base in the organization. Additionally, the employment costs of this group were the foremost expenditure for the organization.
Due to the sheer volume of this group, not all could be included in the research project. These followers were divided into teams (Teams 1 to 7) based
on service location and headed up by middle managers in all but one team (Team 7) who directly reported to an Area Manager. Each team of client-
facing staff consisted of senior practitioners, practitioners, and support workers all of which had varying levels of responsibility. Weekly team
meetings would occur with middle managers as well as ongoing supervision. Beyond that, this group was also given some autonomy in terms of
dealing with their own cases with clients. Each team provided quarterly staff representation on the staff council where the CEO of the organization
sat. Additionally, the organization's staff survey and annual conference provided many opportunities to bring all levels of the organization together
for discussion.
Head Office Support Staff
Team 8
This team of followers (Team 8) had varying functions and responsibilities within head office. Although based in Head Office they were the support
function for the whole organization. The Finance Manager headed this team up. Not all of this group could be included in the research sample.
However, the sample included a HR administrator, a Finance administrator, administrative assistants, a Data and ICT officer and the Contracts and
Development Officer. This team also had representation on the staff council as well as attendance at the annual conference. Additionally, as this team
was based at head office they were in constant contact with the TMT.
3 This approach does have implications for the study of the level of consensus
or shared cognition. Early studies assumed consensus as a unidimensional
construct and investigated it as either present or not. In this vein, some prior
researchers took a strict view of consensus and saw it as the agreement by all
members of a team, rather than just the majority (see Dess & Origer, 1987).
More recent studies have concluded that consensus is multi-faceted (Markóczy,
2001; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) so a larger array of issues and priorities has
been included in studies taking a more holistic approach to the content of
consensus (see Markóczy, 2001). Consequently, due to the increased number of
(footnote continued)
beliefs and additional complexity being studied, it is highly unlikely that in-
dividuals can achieve complete consensus. We address this issue in more detail
in relation to our data in the method and analysis sections.
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outset of the research. However, the dramatic changes in the funding
process were known. These changes were a major cause of concern to
the leadership during early discussions when planning the research.
Development of pool of factors
The first stage of the standardized method of eliciting causal cog-
nitive maps is to develop a sorting procedure (Markóczy & Goldberg,
1995). The essence of sorting technique is that participants sort a pre-
defined large identical pool of factors into two piles; those important for
success of the organization and those not. The factors themselves were
generated based on prior research (see the factors listed in the appen-
dices of Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995; Walsh, 1988). This technique was
used to standardize the elicitation of cognitive maps, which is vital
when they are to be compared and contrasted. The elicitation technique
outlined in Markóczy (2001) and Markóczy and Goldberg (1995) pro-
vided a rich source of data to analyze consensus (Hodgkinson & Healey,
2008) as studying demographics alone is no longer a valid substitute for
cognition (Kaplan, 2011).
The wording of these factors was adapted through six pilot inter-
views to make them relevant in the organizational context.4 The 54
factors used in the sorting task by each participant are listed in
Appendix 1. At the end of the card sort participants were asked (in-
structions in writing) to choose the ten most important factors for
success.
Eliciting cognitive maps
These ten factors were then used to generate cognitive maps in real
time by asking (instructions in writing) each participant to place the ten
cards on a blank sheet of A3 paper and then draw arrows to indicate
relationships between the factors (i.e., whether one factor influences
the other). Participants were also asked to rate the strength of the re-
lationships between factors ranging from −3 (strongly negative) to +3
(strongly positive) at intervals of absolute 1. This provided the parti-
cipant with six potential strengths to consider, as zero would indicate
no relationship between the factors. The direction and strength of re-
lationships between factors forms both ‘indegrees’ and ‘outdegrees’ for
each factor from the pool of constructs and can be presented in an
expanded association matrix to aid subsequent statistical analysis.
In-depth interviews
The cognitive mapping procedure was followed by an in-depth in-
terview to develop a more detailed understanding. We asked partici-
pants what they meant by each factor, to clarify meaning, and why each
factor chosen for inclusion in the cognitive maps was important for
success of the organization. In addition, in phase 2 of data collection,
we asked participants at the end of the interview to reflect on any
changes in beliefs between phases 1 and 2. To facilitate this reflective
account, we presented the cognitive map produced by the respondent in
phase 1 of the data collection so they could accurately comment on the
differences. The 62 interviews (both phases) generated a total of 418 A4
pages of transcriptions.
Calculation of distance ratios
Each hand-drawn map was transferred to the statistical software
package ‘Cognizer’ for detailed analysis (Clarkson & Hodgkinson,
2005). To investigate consensus within the organization, individual
differences between pairs of maps (or expanded association matrices)
were analyzed (see Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995). When one cognitive
map is compared to another, a distance ratio can be calculated to de-
monstrate the difference between the two maps (e.g., A and B). The
calculation for the distance ratios (See Fig. 1) given by Markóczy and
Goldberg (1995) is a development of formula 12 presented by
Langfield-Smith and Wirth (1992).
The general principle of the formula is to calculate all of the dif-
ferences between the two maps including their individual nodes (fac-
tors), arcs (relationships) between nodes, and the strength of these arcs.
Subsequently, the distance ratio provides a statistical value between 0
and 1. Following Markóczy and Goldberg (1995), if a value of 0 is
present then the two maps are exactly identical in terms of nodes and
arcs, whereas a value of 1 represents two completely different cognitive
maps (maximum difference) with no nodes shared. To produce all the
distance ratios required in this study each participant's cognitive map
was individually compared to all of the other participants. The sample
of 31 participants in phase 1 of data collection, for example, generated
465 pairs of distances.
Analysis and results
Table 3 highlights various information regarding how similarities
(consensus) and dissimilarities (diversity) change over time. Similar to
earlier discussions regarding distance ratios closer to zero, more con-
sensus is reflected by a lower mean score. The mean values of the pairs
of maps within a group in phase 1 (e.g., the differences between all the
leaders in phase 1) and within the same group in phase 2 are generated
to allow further comparison of change in the degree of consensus. For
example, the degree of consensus within the leadership group in phase
1 is calculated by taking the mean score of the distance ratios generated
by comparing the 66 pairs of maps based on the 12 leaders (see
Table 3). This procedure is repeated for phase 2. Consequently, a lower
mean in phase 2 when compared to phase 1 would indicate a building
of consensus.
In support of H1, the initial results in Table 3 highlight that con-
sensus did build within the organization between phases 1 and 2. A
paired sample t-test demonstrates a significant difference between the
phase 1 score for all pairs of maps (i.e., comparing the distances of all
leaders and followers in phase 1) and the phase 2 score for all pairs of
maps (x̄1=0.779, σ1=0.146; x̄2=0.710, σ2=0.147; t(464)= 8.596,
p < .001). Therefore, this is a significant finding, because it indicates
the building of organization wide consensus as the radical environ-
mental change was starting to be understood. This finding is also con-
sistent with prior longitudinal cognitive research into the scope of
consensus conducted by Markóczy (2001). An increase in the scope of
consensus refers to an increase in the number of individuals that agree
on the factors important for success within the organization.
Table 3 also indicates that there are changes in the degree of con-
sensus, or how strong individuals agree within their respective groups
(Markóczy, 2001). A paired sample t-test demonstrates a significant
difference between the within phase 1 leadership group score and the
within phase 2 leadership group score (x̄1=0.819, σ1=0.123;
x̄2=0.735, σ2=0.139; t(65)= 3.655, p= .001). Likewise, there was a
significant difference between the within phase 1 follower group score
and the within phase 2 follower group score (x̄1=0.730, σ1=0.159;
x̄2=0.682, σ2=0.160; t(170)= 3.577, p < .001). Consequently, we
find additional support for H1 in that consensus does emerge within
both leader and follower teams over time. Furthermore, there was a
significant difference between the group score when each leader was
compared to each follower in phase 1 and the group score when each
4 The factors used in the research are based on a standardized method of
eliciting cognitive maps presented in prior research. The main idea is that each
participant is presented with the same standard set of a priori factors and then
each choses the 10 factors most relevant to their management situation. The
standard aim of success of the organization is also given to ensure that the same
task is completed by each participant. The factors were not linked to the crisis
per se because we did not want to lead or bias participant's responses in any
way. The standard elicitation procedure, based on the sorting task, involves no
direct communication between researcher and participant and has been re-
commended as a way to reduce interaction and bias in qualitative data col-
lection (see Walsh, 1988).
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leader was compared to each follower in phase 2 (x̄1=0.805,
σ1=0.132; x̄2=0.724, σ2=0.137; t(227)= 7.300, p < .001). These
results indicate that not only did consensus build across the organiza-
tion as a whole but that consensus also formed within both leadership
and follower groups. To overcome any issues around the normality of
these distance ratios, Wilcoxon tests were also conducted producing
similar findings.5
As part of considering H2 we report on the cognitive shifts of in-
dividuals and whether leaders are more prone to cognitive shifts than
followers or vice versa. To examine cognitive shifts, each individual's
cognitive map from phase 1 was compared to their cognitive map from
phase 2 of data collection 18months later. Due to the longitudinal data
collection each pair of maps was used to calculate for similarity and
dissimilarity following Markóczy and Goldberg (1995). When
comparing the maps from both phases, the closer the distance ratio is to
the value of 1 (maximum difference) then the higher the level of cog-
nitive shift.
Table 4 indicates the individual cognitive shifts within leader and
follower groups.
An independent samples t-test demonstrates that there was not a
significant difference at the 0.05 level for cognitive shifts between the
within leadership group score and the within follower group score
(x̄w_leader=0.640, σw_leader=0.175; x̄w_follower,=0.513, σw_follower;=0.186;
t(29)=1.899, p=.068). Consequently, this result does not offer full
Fig. 1. Generalized distance ratio formula (Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995, p. 314).
Table 3
Longitudinal intra-subgroup distances.
M1 N1 M2 N2 x̄1 x̄2 t p σ1 σ2 ∆x̄/σ
All 31 465 31 465 0.779 0.710 8.596 .000 0.146 0.147 0.469
Leaders 12 66 12 66 0.819 0.735 3.655 .001 0.123 0.139 0.604
Followers 19 171 19 171 0.730 0.682 3.577 .000 0.159 0.160 0.300
B.G. 228 228 0.805 0.724 7.300 .000 0.132 0.137 0.591
M1=number of maps (i.e., number of participants) in phase 1. M2=number of maps (participants) in phase 2. N1=number of pairs of distances between the maps
within subgroups for phase 1. N2=number of pairs of distances between the maps within subgroups for phase 2. x̄1=mean distance between maps within
subgroups in phase 1. x̄2=mean distance between maps within subgroups in phase 2. t= t-value comparing means through a paired samples t-test. p= p-value (or
calculated probability). σ1=standard deviation within groups in phase 1. σ2=standard deviation within groups in phase 2. ∆x̄/σ=shows how many standard
deviations away is the new mean from the previous one, calculated as (x̄1− x̄2) / σ2. B.G.= between groups.
Table 4
Individual cognitive shifts within groups.
Leaders Followers All
TM TR MM Total HO PR Total
n 4 2 6 12 6 13 19 31
x̄ 0.697 0.839 0.536 0.640 0.523 0.508 0.513 0.562
σ 0.140 0.071 0.153 0.175 0.139 0.209 0.186 0.189
Median 0.672 0.839 0.573 0.667 0.477 0.533 0.488 0.550
Max 0.889 0.889 0.693 0.889 0.797 0.917 0.917 0.917
Min 0.553 0.788 0.328 0.328 0.424 0.158 0.158 0.158
Range 0.336 0.101 0.365 0.561 0.372 0.758 0.758 0.758
n=number of maps (participants). x̄=mean. σ=standard deviation.
Max=maximum. Min=minimum. TM=Top Managers. TR=Trustees.
MM=Middle Managers. HO=Head Office Staff. PR=Practitioners.
5 All four of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests support the initial findings of the
paired samples t-tests:
− All in Phase 1 (Mdn=0.797) Phase 2 (Mdn=0.705), z=−7.915,
p= .000
− Leaders in Phase 1 (Mdn=0.814) Phase 2 (Mdn=0.757), z=−3.191,
p= .001
− Followers in Phase 1 (Mdn=0.716) Phase 2 (Mdn=0.682), z=−3.448,
p= .001
− Across in Phase 1 (Mdn=0.822) Phase 2 (Mdn=0.710), z=−6.655,
p= .000
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support for H2. Therefore, based on this finding alone being a member of
a particular group or team (leader or follower) does not significantly in-
crease or decrease the amount of cognitive shift during the crisis.
In considering H3a and H3b, Table 5 presents similar information as
Table 3 but provides further analysis on differences within and between
leaders and followers. Again, more consensus is reflected by a lower
mean score as distance ratios are closer to zero indicate higher levels of
similarity. The mean values of the pairs of maps within groups (e.g., the
differences between all the leaders) and between groups (e.g., the dif-
ferences leaders and followers) are generated to allow further com-
parison. For example, the degree of consensus within the leadership
group is calculated by taking the mean score of the distance ratios
generated by comparing the 66 pairs of maps based on the 12 leaders.
To calculate the degree of consensus between groups the mean score of
the distance ratios produced by comparing the 228 pairs of maps be-
tween the 12 leaders and 19 followers (see Table 5).
Comparing within group against between group mean scores de-
monstrates the locus of consensus (Markóczy, 2001). Therefore, a lower
mean in the within group compared to the between group would in-
dicate that the locus of consensus is in the within group. In support of
H3b and indicated in Table 5, an independent samples t-test demon-
strates a significant difference between the within follower group score
(i.e., when each follower is compared to each of the other followers)
and the between group score (i.e., when each follower was compared to
each leader) in phase 1 (x̄w=0.730, σw=0.159; x̄b=0.805,
σb=0.132; t(325.96)=−4.982, p < .001). Likewise, there was a
significant difference between the within follower group score and the
between group score in phase 2 (x̄w=0.682, σw=0.160; x̄b=0.724,
σb=0.137; t(397)=−2.829, p < .01). However, we do not find
support for H3a as there was not a significant difference between the
within leadership group score (i.e., when each leader was compared to
each of the other leaders) and the between group score (i.e., when each
leader was compared to each follower) in phase 1 (x̄w=0.819,
σw=0.123; x̄b=0.805, σb=0.132; t(292)= 0.817, p > .05). Simi-
larly, there was not a significant difference between the within lea-
dership group score and the between group score in phase 2
(x̄w=0.735, σw=0.139; x̄b=0.724, σb=0.137; t(292)= 0.567,
p > .05). These significant results clearly indicate that during this or-
ganizational crisis followers are the initial locus of consensus rather
than leaders. Therefore, consensus first forms in followers in response
to the crisis.
In addition to Table 5, an independent samples t-test demonstrates a
significant difference between the within leadership group score and
the within follower group score in phase 1 (x̄w_leader=0.819,
σw_leader=0.123; x̄w_follower,=0.730, σw_follower;=0.159; t
(151.95)= 4.610, p < .001). There was also a significant difference
between the within leadership group score and the within follower
group score in phase 2 (x̄w_leader=0.735, σw_leader=0.139;
x̄w_follower,=0.682, σw_follower;=0.160; t(235)= 2.374, p < .05). This
finding indicates that at phase 1 of the data collection, at the onset of
the crisis, there is a significant difference in consensus between leaders
and followers. There were higher degrees of consensus within follower
groups than their leaders (hence the lower scores) particularly in phase
1. This significant finding further demonstrates the lack of consensus
within the leadership group at the onset of the crisis. However, the
results also indicate that the differences between the two had started to
converge by the second phase of data collection. Again, to overcome
any issues around the normality of these distance ratios, Mann-Whitney
tests were also conducted producing similar findings.6
To investigate the contribution that followers make towards con-
sensus it is important to triangulate the data to find further support for
followers being the locus of consensus. Therefore, to obtain a deeper
understanding of the contribution of leaders and/or followers to con-
sensus in responding to a crisis, central maps of both groups were de-
veloped to aid a comparison of the two groups (see Markóczy, 1997;
Markóczy & Goldberg, 1995). Central maps are produced by choosing
the nodes (or factors important for success), that are present in over half
of the individuals' cognitive maps in the relative sample; 12 maps for
leaders and 19 maps for followers. The arcs (or relationships) between
the nodes (or factors) that are present and the mean value of the
strengths of these relationships are then elicited to form a central map.
Following this process for both groups in both phases enabled the
production of four central maps. Figs. 2–5 illustrate the central maps of
both leaders and followers in both phases.
In phase 1 of data collection, the central map for the leadership as a
whole (see Fig. 2), indicates only two nodes were selected by more than
half of the leadership group. It is evident that at the beginning of the
crisis there was a limited shared mental model within the leadership
apart from agreement on these two factors important for success. These
two factors were critical because this agreement occurred around the
organization's strategic objectives, but there was no consensus on the
strategies that should be adopted to achieve these objectives. This
finding reflects the difficulties that the leadership experienced at the
beginning of the crisis when attempting to understand what changes
were relevant and significant. It is unlikely, therefore, that the leader-
ship could present a unified vision on how to resolve the crisis, due to
this substantial lack of agreement. Although consensus was lacking in
the leadership group, the followers appeared to have a stronger con-
sensus around four main factors important for success in phase 1 of data
collection, near the onset of the crisis (see Fig. 3).
At phase 2 of data collection it was clear that the leadership groups
had a much stronger understanding of the current situation and had
formed more consensus around several factors (see Fig. 4). The data
indicates a limited prescriptive mental model existing in the leadership
during phase 1 of data collection, but by phase 2 leaders had achieved
more consensus and now placed further emphasis on the importance of
Table 5
Intra-subgroup distances.
M Nw Na x̄w x̄b σw σb t p
Phase 1
All 31 465 0.779 0.146
Leaders 12 66 228 0.819 0.805 0.123 0.132 0.817 .415
Followers 19 171 228 0.730 0.805 0.159 0.132 −4.982 .000
Phase 2
All 31 465 0.710 0.147
Leaders 12 66 228 0.735 0.724 0.139 0.137 0.567 .571
Followers 19 171 228 0.682 0.724 0.160 0.137 −2.829 .005
M=number of maps (participants), Nw=number of pairs of distances between
the maps within subgroups. Nb=number of pairs of distances between the
maps between subgroups. x̄w=mean distance between maps within subgroups.
x̄b=mean distance between members within and outside subgroups.
σw=standard deviation within groups. σb=standard deviation between
groups. t= t-value comparing means through an independent samples t-test.
p= p-value (or calculated probability).
6 All six of the Mann-Whitney tests support the initial findings of the in-
dependent samples t-tests:
− Phase 1 Leaders within (Mdn=0.814) across (Mdn=0.822),
U=7186.5, p= .578
− Phase 1 Followers within (Mdn=0.716) across (Mdn=0.822),
U=14,186.5, p= .000
− Phase 1 Leaders within (Mdn=0.814) Followers within (Mdn=0.716),
U=3827.0, p= .000
− Phase 2 Leaders within (Mdn=0.757) across (Mdn=0.710),
U=7056.5, p= .442
− Phase 2 Followers within (Mdn=0.682) across (Mdn=0.710),
U=16,680.0, p= .014
− Phase 2 Leaders within (Mdn=0.757) Followers within (Mdn=0.682),
U=4532.0, p= .019
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service quality, responsibility to funders and the motivation of staff. In
other words, at phase 2 of data collection, leaders displayed more
consensus, because five factors (instead of two previously) they thought
important for success were shared by more than half of the leadership
group. Additionally, by phase 2 followers had built even stronger
consensus (see Fig. 5). They now shared consensus around an additional
three factors; service quality, developing staff, and promoting the ser-
vice. In other words, at phase 2 of data collection followers displayed
considerable consensus, because seven factors (instead of four pre-
viously) they thought important for success were shared by more than
half of the follower group.
These findings emphasize that limited shared mental models in the
leadership group at the beginning of the crisis caused confusion over
time. Followers are likely to have experienced difficulty concurring
with the leaders' vision for the future when the leadership was unclear
of their own prescriptive mental model. Based on the lack of consensus
it is likely that different leaders put over different visions for the future,
which caused confusion for followers.
We then compared the central maps of leaders and followers be-
tween phase 1 and phase 2 to find similarities and differences. The
distance ratios between these central maps were calculated based on
Markóczy and Goldberg (1995). See Table 6.
The followers by phase 2 were more closely aligned to their mental
model from phase 1 (0.312), showing that their beliefs were similar to
their own initial reference group, rather than their leaders. However,
the data also indicate that leaders changed considerably between
phases 1 and 2 (0.470), which is also reflected in a higher score for
cognitive shift. This begins to lend support for H2, that higher cognitive
shifts were present in leaders rather than followers.
Most interestingly, the data highlights the extent that consensus has
spread from the leadership teams to the follower teams or vice versa
during the crisis. The findings point to the notion that the prescriptive
mental model of leaders in phase 2 is much more similar to followers
from phase 1 (0.329), than to their own reference group from phase 1.
The expectation that as the crisis developed the mental models of fol-
lower teams in phase 2 would be similar to leaders in phase 1 (0.669),
did not materialize. In sum, leaders have converged in thinking more
towards followers than vice versa. Further supporting H2, that leader-
ship teams will have a higher degree of cognitive shift than follower
teams in response to a crisis. Consequently, the data indicate the pos-
sibility that in times of crisis followers are just as important as leaders in
determining a prescriptive mental model for the future.
Next, the distances ratio between each individual and the central
maps in both phases was calculated. Table 7 highlights how much an
individual in each phase of data collection is closer to either a leader
group mental model or follower group mental model from phase 1 or
phase 2.
The findings confirm that in phase 2, individuals within the orga-
nization as a whole are more likely to be closer in thinking to the fol-
lowers' central map of phase 1 than that of their leaders. In sum, the
findings support H3b; that followers will be the initial locus of con-
sensus, but not H3a. During the crisis, the mental models of leadership
teams converge towards follower teams, and not the other way around.
Our expectation at the start of our research, predicted by theory,
was that leaders' beliefs would change to be in-line with the new en-
vironmental conditions and followers would catch up later. This ex-
pectation did not materialize, so we now turn to a brief investigation as
to why there was a spread of consensus from followers to leaders. At the
end of the interview in phase 2, we asked participants to reflect on any
changes to their beliefs. Each participant was presented with a copy of
their cognitive map from phase 1 so it could be compared with the map
from phase 2. The participants were asked to reflect on the changes.
Interestingly, most prominent in leaders' quotations is the notion of




20. Helping clients achieve 'recovery'
42. Relationships with partner agencies / organizations / services
Fig. 2. Central map for Leaders in Phase 1.
31 20 42 51
31 0.00 2.83 3.00 3.00
20 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
42 2.67 3.00 0.00 2.00
51 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00
31.Motivation of staff 
20. Helping clients achieve 'recovery'
42. Relationships with partner agencies / organizations / services
51. Supporting clients with their problems
Fig. 3. Central map for Followers in Phase 1.
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“I think everybody who works in this organization is a resource … often
the people on the ground have the best solutions.… we need to be able to
make them part of the solution and listen to their innovative ideas and try
to encapsulate them in our way forward.”
Top Manager 02
“…it's just a joy actually being involved with more new staff and seeing
their freshness, their ingenuity and I think where you've got managers and
seniors that generate creativity I think generally people are becoming
hugely more flexible than they were… I just think of how [the TMT] have
changed over the last six months and obviously that has a model effect on
us and, as I say, I think [The CEO] has moved out of sorting our messes
out and taken a very firm view on “You sort it out. You work out between
you how you're going to change it and come and tell me about it”.”
Middle Manager 03
“…I think it's about that forward thinking, … if you're actually thinking
“What can I do next? How can we make that better?” or there's a pro-
blem and “How can we solve it?” And I think if you can get a team and
stuff together and thinking of that they get motivated to sort of be solution
focused or to plan.”
Middle Manager 04
“…now perhaps I'm more confident that we can achieve the targets and I
balance making sure staff are completely on board and are attended to as
well, whereas perhaps it might have been a bit too one dimensional in the
past”
Middle Manager 06
This shift in focus to include followers into the change process further
supports the findings of the importance of shared mental models in fol-
lowers during slowly emerging cumulative organizational crises.
Consequently, as the crisis developed leaders also highlighted significant
changes to communication within the organization as a positive:
“Last year I felt very adrift strategically and just wasn't sure where we
were going. I'm not entirely sure we know where we're going now, but I
think at least people are talking about it and we've got some ideas and
some plans.”
Top Manager 01
“I think there was an improvement in communication. … I think the
communication was there, but sometimes there were some ulterior mes-
sages…We talk more openly about the problems we're facing as an or-
ganization in meetings which I think is a good development.”
Middle Manager 02
“I have a feeling that there is more overt discussion about what we're
learning how we're changing.”
Middle Manager 03
The previous quotations add further insights into a potential me-
chanism through increased two-way communication as to how fol-
lowers started to potentially influence the movement of leaders' mental
models between phases 1 and 2. Finally, several leaders discussed that
the initial multitude of changes to their environment was eventually
stabilized. This was completed through focusing on staff as a key asset
and their role in the importance of service delivery and quality in the
survival of the organization:
“I think that 12 months ago we needed to go through a sort of shake
down and rediscover ourselves a little bit and part of the rediscovering
ourselves is a realization of the importance of good quality staff. Not that
it wasn't important or not realized back then, but I think it's becoming
even more important.”
Top Manager 02
“For me personally I believe that this is a good quality organization and I
believe that it has a passion for delivering quality services… The case is
about how you can do things as cheaply as possible and I don't think that
is at the heart of our values. So for me the trouble we've got currently
economically is about good services being able to weather the storms
really and to be there.”
Top Manager 04
45 42 20 31 43
45 0.00 2.25 3.00 2.75 2.25
42 2.00 0.00 2.50 2.00 3.00
20 3.00 2.50 0.00 3.00 0.00
31 3.00 2.50 3.00 0.00 -1.00
43 2.00 1.00 -0.50 -1.00 0.00
45. Service quality
42. Relationships with partner agencies / organizations / services
20. Helping clients achieve 'recovery'
31.Motivation of staff 
43. Responsibility to funders/commissioners
Fig. 4. Central map for Leaders in Phase 2.
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“Well, I think it's [service quality] implicit in all the contracts we've got,
but in any case I think it's the heart of what I believe should be the
philosophy of the organization.”
Trustee 01
“I think that unless you're a service that provides good quality work, then
you're not going to get funding in the future and I think that we've seen
other organizations fail bids and so on and we've gained tenders where
there have been qualities of poor service before.”
Middle Manager 03
“Because if we're not delivering a quality service, then I don't think clients
will come to us or come back to us or they'll disengage, … also has an
impact on the funding and everything because obviously if we're
delivering a quality service, then commissioners and that will be more
inclined to either fund us or continue to commission us.”
Middle Manager 04
It appears that going through a period of panic brought about by the
loss of contracts and successfully tendering for new contracts has made
the leadership realize the need to focus on service quality. This focus
was required to maintain existing contracts (making sure that they do
not lose any more) and to service the new contracts they had gained to
resolve the crisis.
Discussion
Our main findings demonstrate that leaders mental models, over the
two phases of data collection, change and increase in similarity to those
of followers at the onset of the crisis. Therefore, the findings support
hypothesis 3b; that followers are the initial locus of consensus rather
than leaders. It is significant to note that during slowly evolving cu-
mulative organizational crises, shared mental models can emerge in
follower teams before the leadership. The convergence in mental
models is also reflected in the partial support for hypothesis 2; that
higher cognitive shifts occurring in leaders during a crisis. Our key
findings confirm, that during organizational crises, followers can play a
central role in the process of forming consensus to resolve a crisis.
In this current study, through analyzing the mental models of both
leaders and followers in a naturalistic setting, we have been able to
identify where consensus first forms during a crisis. Our findings
20 45 42 31 51 13 39
20 0.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.80 0.00 0.00
45 2.71 0.00 2.50 2.67 3.00 2.00 3.00
42 3.00 2.50 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 3.00
31 3.00 2.17 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
51 2.80 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 3.00 2.80 0.00 2.67 2.50 0.00 0.00
39 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20. Helping clients achieve 'recovery'
45. Service quality
42. Relationships with partner agencies / organizations / services
31.Motivation of staff 
51. Supporting clients with their problems
13. Developing staff
39. Promoting the service
Fig. 5. Central map for Followers in Phase 2.
Table 6













Leaders Phase 2 0.470 0.329 –
Followers Phase
2
0.669 0.312 0.366 –
Leaders Phase 1 refers to the central map of leaders in phase 1. Likewise,
Followers Phase 1 refers to the central map of followers in phase 1 and so on.
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question whether a coherent prescriptive mental model was in place in
the leadership teams of the organization shortly after the onset of the
crisis (Combe & Carrington, 2015; Mumford et al., 2007). Developing a
prescriptive mental model for the future would require leaders to have
a substantial cognitive capacity to simplify events in such a way that a
viable vision can be formulated (Partlow, Medeiros, & Mumford, 2015,
p. 466). Our findings raise serious concerns that leaders are able to do
this easily.
Our findings suggest that cumulative organizational crises can in-
tensify a dynamic exchange between the mental models of leaders and
followers. Here, followers may have just as much influence on leaders
than leaders on followers. This concurs with prior research undertaken
by Carsten et al. (2010) who also confirm that followers can be chal-
lenging and should not be viewed as just passive and obedient. Parti-
cularly as strategic planning can fail when those involved in im-
plementation are excluded, participatory planning to include non-
leaders becomes essential (Ketokivi & Castañer, 2004). Furthermore, a
strategy is less likely to be sabotaged if disagreements are synthesized
into a common vision (Olson, Parayitam, & Bao, 2007).
Prior empirical research suggests that alternative job roles based
around different task environments, shape mental models (Daniels
et al., 1994; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994). While we did not study
antecedents to cognition, our findings point to a similar conclusion.
Initially, it seems that the role or position of an individual within the
organization did have some influence on their beliefs in how to respond
to the crisis. Followers, in client facing roles emphasized operational
issues, such as service quality, from the start of the crisis, while top
managers focused on a variety of more strategic issues.
We now turn to the potential reasons for our findings not supporting
the expectation that consensus to resolve a crisis will first develop in
leaders. One main reason is based on the context of this current study,
because the resolutions to resolve the crisis were more operational,
rather than strategic, in nature. Redesigning the process for tendering
for new contracts, to resolve the financial crisis brought about by the
loss of major contracts, required coordinating data and analysis on
previous performance in service delivery. This data already existed in
the organization, but was not used in the tendering submissions pre-
viously. The more robust demonstration of successful service delivery in
existing and past contracts, resulted in the award of several large new
contracts, which resolved the financial crisis. The increased focus on
service quality was required to meet client expectations, because the
firm started to emphasize previous high levels of service delivery in the
tendering process. As service delivery is largely the domain of followers
it is perhaps not surprising that followers took the lead in thinking of
this focus as a way forward.
Another possible explanation for our findings is that followers are
closer to key external actors, such as customers and suppliers (Ketokivi
& Castañer, 2004, p. 341), and can articulate change from their per-
spective, first to each other, and then to leaders. In cumulative
organizational crises, interaction with these external actors is likely to
take up a major part of the followers' time in their job roles, and be
influential in their thinking about overcoming crises. After interacting
with key external actors, followers may be more willing to criticize each
other's thinking than leaders, so that critical reflection and cross un-
derstandings could occur more in followers than leaders during cu-
mulative organizational crises (Huber & Lewis, 2010).
Limitations
The findings are based on a single in-depth case study when leaders
and followers confront an organizational crisis, so the study only offers
analytical generalization (generalization to theory), rather than statis-
tical generalization. Specifically, the case study is based on a cumula-
tive type of organizational crisis (financial crisis) and its resolution over
an 18-month period. While the findings are limited to cumulative or-
ganizational crises, the scope and generalizability are likely to be large.
The findings are likely to be applicable to organizational contexts in-
volving operational problems, where followers have a better under-
standing than leaders of key challenges and their solutions.
However, the involvement of followers is unlikely to occur when
crises develop abruptly, such as can occur in some military situations.
Abrupt crises can emerge in hours and require an immediate response
(Hwang & Lichtenthal, 2000; James & Wooten, 2005). Despite occur-
ring quickly and unpredictably, the causes of abrupt crises may be
clearer compared to the ambiguity faced during cumulative crises
(Hwang & Lichtenthal, 2000, p. 134). Therefore, mental models of both
leader and follower teams are likely to attain higher levels of consensus
during abrupt crises, rather than cumulative ones. Likewise, focusing on
a not-for-profit organization added further complexity due to the pre-
sence of multiple stakeholders (Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000). In the
UK heath sector there is a disparity between two customer groups. This
disparity occurs because there is a differentiation between those who
pay for services, such as funders and donors, and those who use the
service, such as clients, patients or beneficiaries (Bruce, 1995; Shapiro,
1973; Vázquez, Álvarez, & Santos, 2002). Any limitations to the amount
of generalization, however, need to be balanced with a major ad-
vantage. Single case study method can provide deep understandings
into the responses to the same crisis in a naturalistic setting.
A focus on mental models has meant that other effects have not been
studied. For example, we did not investigate any antecedent effects
such as the influence of power dynamics on cognition (Balogun, Jacobs,
Jarzabkowski, Mantere, & Vaara, 2014; Dess & Priem, 1995; Weick,
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Furthermore, different types of leadership
such as charismatic, ideological, and pragmatic leaders (Mumford,
Antes, Caughron, & Friedrich, 2008) were not investigated. A study of
different types of leaders could shed further light on the vision forma-
tion process between followers and their leaders (Strange & Mumford,
2002).
Table 7







x̄ σ x̄ σ x̄ σ
Ph1 - Distance from leaders' central map in phase 1 0.897 0.066 0.912 0.072 0.888 0.063
Ph1 - Distance from followers' central map in phase 1 0.781 0.128 0.853 0.130 0.736 0.107
Ph1 - Distance from leaders' central map in phase 2 0.754 0.097 0.801 0.110 0.724 0.077
Ph1 - Distance from followers' central map in phase 2 0.703 0.186 0.801 0.165 0.640 0.175
Ph2 - Distance from leaders' central map in phase 1 0.889 0.068 0.894 0.076 0.887 0.065
Ph2 - Distance from followers' central map in phase 1 0.779 0.128 0.824 0.126 0.751 0.125
Ph2 - Distance from leaders' central map in phase 2 0.688 0.138 0.652 0.158 0.711 0.123
Ph2 - Distance from followers' central map in phase 2 0.613 0.172 0.685 0.141 0.567 0.178
N=number of maps (participants). x̄=mean of individuals' distances from central maps. σ=standard deviation. Ph1=Phase 1 respondents. Ph2=Phase 2
respondents.
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Additional data would also help understand any relationship be-
tween strategic thinking and strategy implementation. It is possible that
the implementation of a particular strategy during the crisis was re-
flected initially in the cognitive maps. However, our research design
makes it difficult to trace how leaders' and followers' mental models
relate to the strategy of the firm and whether this was emergent in
nature (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). The firm did
focus on improving service quality (which is present in the cognitive
maps) as part of introducing a new robust tendering process, and this
focus eventually led to gaining new large contracts to overcome the
financial crisis.
While the findings do highlight that the expected causal link pre-
dicted by vision formation theory did not materialize, we did not fully
investigate causality. To strengthen the evidence of causality three al-
ternative research designs should be considered. One, an experimental
research design could potentially isolate the causal effects. However,
conducting such a study in a naturalistic setting with control groups
could be problematic and compromise its external validity. Two, a re-
search agenda that incorporates longitudinal participant observational
data from meetings, as well as documentary evidence, to back up claims
of influence could add to the initial work set out in this current study.
Three, developing the longitudinal research design, to capture pre-crisis
data would allow researchers to identify whether the cognitive maps
before the onset of the crisis contained similar beliefs to those found in
either phases of this study. However, to identify a suitable focal orga-
nization(s) before a crisis occurs could be extremely difficult due to the
problem of forecasting a crisis in advance.
While we did trace cognitive shifts in leaders and followers and the
locus of consensus over time as a crisis developed, we did not trace the
performance implications of similarities and differences in mental
models. Leader performance is key during crises (Barrett, Vessey, &
Mumford, 2011; Mumford et al., 2007) but tracing the links between
mental models and performance at different organizational levels was
beyond the scope of this study. Tracing these links has proved parti-
cularly difficult as the performance effects of consensus and diversity
remains equivocal despite the abundance of research investigating the
relationship (Fiol, 1994; Gonzalez-Benito, Aguinis, Boyd, & Suarez-
Gonzalez, 2012; Miller et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1994; West & Schwenk,
1996).
Finally, the findings are based on a small longitudinal sample size of
31. Due to the longitudinal research design, the initial sample of 40
individuals did suffer some sample attrition over the 18months from
phase 1 to phase 2 of data collection. Increasing the initial sample size
would have alleviated this problem to some extent. However, high
personnel turnover is often a consequence of radical change and sub-
sequent crises so sample attrition is difficult to eliminate from long-
itudinal studies into crises.
Contributions to theory
This study is the first to address the temporal issues of sensemaking
and vision formation during a slowly emerging cumulative organiza-
tional crisis within both leaders and followers in a naturalistic setting.
Previous studies have largely neglected these important issues under
crises conditions at different hierarchical levels in team settings. The
longitudinal analysis has allowed us to capture shared mental models
within and between leader and follower teams over time. Therefore,
building upon prior research, our study makes a key contribution to the
literature on vision formation during crisis conditions.
When theorizing around sensemaking, researchers highlight the
importance of cognitive diversity and collective sensemaking when
confronting novel environments (Eden & Ackermann, 2010; Seidl &
Werle, 2018). However, empirical research tends to highlight the im-
portance of different management perspectives and downplay the in-
clusion of followers in the sensemaking process. Our research suggests
that through shared mental models, followers can have a considerable
input into sensemaking and the development of a prescriptive mental
model, as the basis of vision formation (Valcea et al., 2011). Through
studying shared mental models, we have found that followers, collec-
tively, can make sense of a crisis prior to the leadership. The findings
revealed that later in the crisis, the mental models of leaders were si-
milar to the initial shared mental model held by followers. In other
words, the findings also challenge the assumption that communication
and influence between leaders and followers is strictly one-way (Marks
et al., 2000) and top-down (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess, 1987). Conse-
quently, our findings point to a dynamic exchange occurring between
the team mental models of both leaders and followers.
Implicit in the prior literature is the notion that cognitive shifts are
required for shared mental models to emerge (Dionne et al., 2010;
Markóczy, 2001). Following Foldy et al. (2008) and Ospina and Foldy
(2010) we contribute to theory through demonstrating that during a
cumulative organizational crisis individuals have varying degrees of
cognitive shift. Specifically, our findings offer partial support for sub-
sequent higher cognitive shifts occurring in leaders. Therefore, the
leaders' initial vision for the resolution to the crisis required most
change. This evidence of cognitive shift in the leadership, when first
facing new environmental conditions, concurs with prior research that
has found a time lag in developing new mental models to match novel
conditions (Barr, 1998; Barr et al., 1992; Hodgkinson, 1997; Reger &
Palmer, 1996).
The reasons suggested in prior empirical studies for cognitive inertia
in leaders have been that learned recipes (Spender, 1989), and routi-
nized ways of thinking (Nelson & Winter, 1984) play prominent roles.
There are additional potential reasons for initial cognitive inertia when
resolving crises. One, the leaderships' inability to listen to others so they
were not responsive. Two, inertia may have been caused by the oppo-
site; the leadership engaged in collective sensemaking so they were
listening to too many different perspectives, which caused a time lag.
Three, inertia may have been caused by errors, myopia, and competi-
tive blind spots (Marcy & Mumford, 2010; Ng, Westgren, & Sonka,
2009; Porac et al., 1989; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). This last suggestion
aligns with prior empirical research, which highlighted the possibility
that crisis environments are partially socially constructed, leading to
errors of judgement (Porac et al., 1989).
An alternative potential explanation is also suggested by the find-
ings presented in this current study. As a time lag occurred for the
leadership to be aligned with the mental models that first emerged
within followers during the crisis, it may be that the leaders experi-
enced a crisis themselves. The leaderships' power and authority may
have been undermined by inconsistent sensemaking, and lack of con-
sensus in how to respond to the crisis, which caused them to retrench.
Therefore, our findings point to the need for further theory develop-
ment to incorporate additional antecedents into explanations for cog-
nitive inertia during crisis conditions.
Contributions to practice
Leaders need to be aware of the alternative insights that followers
can bring to resolving crises. Understanding the evolving mental
models of followers is a key task for leaders in responding to cumulative
organizational crises. Therefore, leaders can call upon followers to help
make sense of the crisis, in the knowledge that followers will need to
respond quickly to implement the strategic response. While strategic
decisions during crises need to be taken speedily, the success of these
decisions are dependent on the commitment and consensus with others
(Dooley et al., 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988).
Due to the presence of multi-teams at different hierarchical levels
(DeChurch et al., 2010), orchestrating the strategic response swiftly can
be problematic. In other words, to enable effective and coordinated
remedial action following a crisis, shared mental models are required
(Burke et al., 2006; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Day et al., 2004;
Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Marks et al., 2000) in both leader and
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follower teams. Consequently, leaders should prioritize consensus and
coordination with their followers to ensure a swift organizational re-
sponse. To aid in this endeavor leaders need to involve followers in
workshops for collective sensemaking and crisis resolution.
Organizations may also benefit from receiving training and devel-
opment in causal analysis to help prepare for crises (Marcy & Mumford,
2010). Likewise, cognitive mapping itself and other cognitive decision
aids could improve decision quality. For example, organizational work-
shops using cognitive mapping could highlight key differences in mental
models between leaders and followers at an early stage. Furthermore,
these intra-organizational workshops may help shared understandings
and aid consensus development (Ackermann & Eden, 2011; Eden &
Ackermann, 2010). These cognitive workshops could allow for guided
reflection which can enhance performance (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, &
Naegele, 2007). Such reflexivity through cognitive mapping could also
help overcome biases (Narayanan, Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011).
Future directions
There are several possible explanations for our findings, which re-
quire further research. One potential explanation for the importance of
followers in our particular case study is that the solutions to overcome
problems may have been required at the operational level, rather than
the strategic level. If this was the case then the role of vision provider
can become unclear. Consequently, differentiating between strategic
and operational solutions to different crises is an important future re-
search direction to build on vision formation theory.
The interaction between followers in day-to-day communication is
also likely to be much more common than interaction between leaders,
which gives more opportunity for followers to influence each other.
Therefore, future research should investigate the quantity and sub-
stance of interactions to investigate influence between leaders and
followers. The influence between leaders - leaders and followers - fol-
lowers also needs to be included in future studies. In this current study,
we focused on examining individual mental models within team set-
tings. We did not investigate the interaction and streams of commu-
nication (Ocasio, Loewenstein, & Nigam, 2015), between and within
leader and follower teams. In practice, organizational actors attempt to
not only make sense of ambiguous situations, but also influence others
(Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis &
Lawrence, 2007). Future research should integrate the insights that can
be made by investigating individual mental models based on sense-
making, with more detailed research on influence through sensegiving.
In this current study, the antecedent effects of the influence of
power dynamics on mental models during the crisis were not studied
(Dess & Priem, 1995). Therefore, further studies into sensemaking, to
examine power and politics in more detail, are required (Balogun et al.,
2014; Weick et al., 2005). Particularly, future research could also focus
on the role and influence of the CEO in the leadership teams (Bromiley
& Rau, 2016; Georgakakis, Greve, & Ruigrok, 2017). As a result, addi-
tional data would help to understand the influence of power dynamics
when responding to crises. Another possible fruitful future research
would be to understand the influence of types of leadership and lea-
dership styles in crisis conditions.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our study takes a step towards understanding the
spread of consensus within team mental models of leaders and fol-
lowers. During cumulative crises, our findings start to challenge the
conventional view of one-way communication and influence from lea-
ders to followers. This study opens up the possibilities that leader team
mental models can converge towards that of followers under certain
conditions. We hope we inspire future work to examine further the
emergence of and transmission between shared mental models in both
leader and follower teams.
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Appendix 1. List of factors in the sorting task
1 Accessibility
2 Barriers to change within the organization
3 Building resources for the future – financial/equipment/human
4 Company brand image
5 Competitor analysis
6 Control of service costs
7 Cooperation across all departments and service locations
8 Coordinating operations
9 Current resources – financial/equipment/human
10 Delegating tasks to others
11 Detailed analysis of company finances
12 Detailed information/data on customers
13 Developing staff




18 Geographical position of services
19 Government policy
20 Helping clients achieve ‘recovery’
21 Innovative services
22 Internal efficiency
23 Knowledge of competitors
24 Knowledge of customers
25 Knowledge of internal operations
26 Layout of services
27 Learning to improve
28 Level of funding
29 Management intuition
30 Measuring customer achievements
31 Motivation of staff
32 Open communication





38 Price differentiation from competitors
39 Promoting the service
40 Public relations
41 Range of extra services
42 Relationships with partner agencies/organizations/services
43 Responsibility to funders/commissioners
44 Responsibility to trustees
45 Service quality
46 Service space
47 Shared corporate culture
48 Speed of response to change in customers' needs
49 Staff income
50 Support from head office
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51 Supporting clients with their problems
52 Taking risks in decision-making
53 Target focused
54 Targeting new funders
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